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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades there has been a shift in the way the development agenda is negotiated
and set characterised by the opening of the ‘development space’ to a broader range of
actors, particularly civil society. Critical approaches to this opening have identified the
asymmetries of power between different civil society actors in the one hand, and between
civil society actors and international financial institutions (IFIs) on the other. This has
resulted in the inclusion of civil society actors that adopt existing development orthodoxy
in the development space and the exclusion of those that challenge this orthodoxy. Within
this literature there is an emerging emphasis on the agency of those actors excluded, and
reconstructive critical approaches have highlighted the potential for alternative*Correspondence to: Dr Duncan McDuie-Ra, School of Social Sciences and International Studies, G 27 Morven
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The Dynamics Of Inclusion And Exclusion 21development ideas and practices from these actors, particularly within the South. However
this analysis is rarely extended to religious actors despite growing recognition of the role
played by religious actors in development at the local and national levels in the South and at
the international level (Haynes, 2007; Clarke and Jennings, 2008). This article seeks to
open a critical research agenda on the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of religious
actors in the development space at the international and local levels.1 We argue that
analysis of the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of civil society actors in the
development space needs to be extended to religious actors and that the potential of these
actors for providing development alternatives and counter-hegemonic agency needs to be
given more consideration. We are particularly concerned with relations between civil
society actors and IFIs, as it is these relations that best exemplify the opening of the
development space and the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. We have chosen the
World Bank as a site for analysis because in recent years it has broadened its development
approach to include civil society actors and has created an explicit space for engaging with
religious actors in development.
In examining these dynamics we make a three-fold argument. First, in both the literature
on religious actors in development and the engagement between IFIs and religious actors
the focus is on formalised religious actors, often referred to as faith-based organisations or
FBOs, and as a result informal actors are often overlooked in negotiating, setting and
contesting the development agenda.2 Secondly, the varied politics of religious actors are
rarely articulated. Unlike secular civil society actors, religious actors tend to be viewed
homogenously and separately from other civil society actors and from the communities in
which they are embedded. We contend that religious actors are deeply involved in both top-
down development and in contesting development; thus a singular form of agency cannot
be generalised to all religious actors involved in development. Thirdly, underpinning both
of these limitations is a lack of consideration for the mutually constitutive relationship
between secular and sacral3 elements at the local level and increasingly at the international
level. This relationship shapes the way the development agenda is negotiated, set, and
contested in different locations and must be considered in research on the role of religion in
development and in the practice of development in the field, particularly in the context of
ongoing engagement between religious actors and IFIs and between secular and religious
civil society actors.
At the outset it is important to make two disclaimers. Firstly, we are not advocating that
religion holds the solution to deficiencies in the development agenda at the international,
national, or local levels. Nor are we suggesting that religious actors, by definition, are more1We use the term ‘local’ to refer to political and social spaces existing at the sub-national level within nation-states
as defined by the peoples that constitute said spaces. Such a space can be limited in size and scale, such as a
particular community centred on a village or number of villages or an urban locality. Local can also refer to a
political and social space extending across provinces, federal states, autonomous regions or other sub-national
units. Local can also refer to a non-territorial political and social space within which development, civil society
actors, and religious actors are embedded such as among particular ethnic groups, indigenous communities, and
class and caste groups. Local in not used as a substitute for ‘national’, especially when being analysed in
comparison to ‘international’.
2We use the term ‘religious actors’ rather than faith-based organisations when recognising both formal and
informal actors associated with religious organisations and communities.
3We adopt Haynes’ three-fold definition of religion as ‘to do with: the idea of transcendence, that is, it relates to
supernatural realities; with sacredness, that is, as a system of language and practice that organizes the world in
terms of what is deemed holy; and with ultimacy, that is, it relates people to the ultimate conditions of existence.’
(Haynes, 2006, p. 223) These attributes constitute what we have called ‘sacral’ elements that exist in the spaces of
development.
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 22, 20–36 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/jid
22 D. McDuie-Ra and J. A. Reescapable of providing development alternatives. We adopt an open critical perspective on
religion in development, analysing the different forms it takes and the different
contributions it makes to development whether positive, negative, and/or ambiguous.
Secondly, we are not suggesting that religion be simply grafted onto existing ways of
understanding or practicing development. We do not wish to ‘add’ religion to what is
already known about development; rather we are analysing religion because it is a primary
element in most of the locations where development interventions take place. Religion
exists in the lives of those subject to the policies derived from development agendas and in
the lives of those formulating such policies. Yet critical discussions of the role of religious
actors in development have often overlooked many of the ways that religious actors
contribute to improving people’s lives.
This article begins by discussing the opening of the development space to civil society,
including religious actors. While the opening of the development space has altered the
relationship between states, international development agencies and civil society, the focus
of this article is restricted to the enhanced role for civil society actors in their dealings with
IFIs. The second section uses existing literature to analyse the critical reading of this
opening and presents a typology of civil society actors included in, and excluded from, the
development space. The third section applies this critical reading to religious actors using
the example of the World Bank and its engagement with religious actors. The fourth section
builds upon the case study to infer upon the way IFIs such as the World Bank favour
formalised organisations and exclude other religious actors. The final section assesses the
shortcomings of the dominant critical approach in identifying these dynamics and suggests
further directions in research before the article concludes.2 OPENING THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
The development agenda refers here to the issues defined as ‘problems’ and the solutions
proposed to alleviate or at least reduce the impacts of these problems. Setting the
development agenda involves gathering knowledge about conditions in the South, which of
these conditions require intervention, which agencies will intervene, who will be partners
in these interventions, and the policies to guide these interventions. Since the early 1990s,
the actors involved in negotiating and setting the development agenda and implementing
development projects have broadened significantly. The political space for negotiating and
setting the development agenda, termed the ‘development space’ here, has been opened to
a range of actors from academics to professional practitioners, planners to think-tanks,
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to representatives from transnational corpor-
ations. This enables these actors to participate in the process of defining development
priorities, formulating suitable polices and implementing these policies.
Given the opening of the development space, the question of ‘who sets the development
agenda?’ has become crucial for critical scholars. It has been argued that knowledge
underpins the setting of the development agenda and is concentrated in IFIs, particularly
the World Bank and regional development banks, as well as influential bilateral aid donors.
Since the shift away from state-led development towards market-led development in the
1970s the power of IFIs has increased as they control both knowledge to set development
priorities and material capacity to implement them (Bøa˚s and McNeill, 2004, pp. 3–6). The
development agenda espoused by IFIs came under heavy criticism throughout the 1980s
and 1990s and the response of IFIs has been refereed to as a ‘new kind of synthesis’ thatCopyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 22, 20–36 (2010)
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for good governance, and the impacts of market-led adjustments on furthering poverty
(O¨nis¸ and S¸enses, 2005, p. 273). This has been a complex process involving multiple actors
and the set of ideas emerging from this process remain heavily contested. However, one
clear and significant outcome of this process is that IFIs have opened a space for other
actors to negotiate and set the development agenda (Guttal, 2006, p. 27). More than any
other actors, the opening of the development space has led to a greater role for civil society
in setting, negotiating, and implementing development priorities (Carbone and Lister,
2006, p. 7).
While definitions of civil society vary most theorists refer to a ‘sphere’ of political and
social activity that is separate from the state and the market and to the actors that operate
within this sphere (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 18; Scholte, 2002; Kaldor, 2003). Used in
this way civil society encompasses a range of actors, including social movements,
community organisations, political parties, trade unions, though the term is increasingly
being used to refer simply to NGOs, particularly in discussions of development (Amoore
and Langley, 2004, p. 91). At the international, national, and local levels IFIs and bilateral
aid donors are viewing civil society as a means of legitimising development programs by
engaging civil society actors as partners (Edwards, 1999; Hudson, 2001; Henry et al., 2004;
Harrison, 2007). This has been particularly evident since the World Bank introduced ‘good
governance’ and fostering of ‘social capital’ as a major part of its funding conditions
(Harriss, 2001/2004; McNeill, 2004) and since the adoption of a policy discourse that
advocates ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ by IFIs and bilateral donors (Cornwall and
Brock, 2006). Additionally, recent scholarship has focussed on the inclusion of religious
actors within civil society their increasing visibility in development (Benedetti, 2006;
Clarke, 2006).3 ‘NEW SYNTHESIS’ OR TOP-DOWN HEGEMONY?
Far from seeing this as the beginning of a more inclusive and participatory development
agenda, critical scholarship has drawn attention to the complicity of civil society actors in
reproducing the top-down development agenda. The aim of critical theory is to examine the
existing order and question how that order has been formed, and then focus on the ways that
the order may be transformed (Cox, 1981/1996, pp. 89–90). Cox made the distinction
between problem solving theory and critical theory. Unlike problem solving theory which
seeks to explain events using existing structures and actors, a critical approach does not
take institutions or social and power relations as natural or given, rather critical theory
seeks to explore their origins and assess whether they are in the process of changing (Cox,
1981/1996, pp. 97–9). Critical approaches explore the potential for alternatives and
encourage struggles to achieve such ends (Linklater, 1992, p. 79). Critical approaches to
development seek to deconstruct and examine the material and ideational power relations
that underpin development orthodoxy, yet they also seek to reconstruct alternatives to that
orthodoxy (Matthews, 2004, p. 373), and thus questions of inclusion and exclusion form an
important element of critical approaches.
Critical analysts of the opening of the development space have concluded that far from
signifying any substantial change in development thinking or practice, the ‘new synthesis’
demonstrates the hegemony of the international development establishment, particularly
IFIs (Ocampo, 2002; Taylor, 2004; Girvan, 2006; Guttal, 2006). According to thisCopyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 22, 20–36 (2010)
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opportunities and effectively coopts oppositional actors, particularly through working and
funding partnerships between civil society actors and operational agencies. In short, IFIs
and other donors fund civil society actors that will not challenge the programs being
implemented, will not destabilise local society, and will legitimise the programs by
agreeing to be local partners in a subordinate position (Huddock, 1999; Lewis, 2001). Thus
it has been argued that the relationship between civil society and IFIs and other
donors has shifted from an oppositional to a co-operative dynamic (Utting, 2006). This
leaves actors attempting to challenge or change the development agenda marginalised in
favour of actors supportive of the status quo.
Chandhoke argues that civil society actors favoured in development are well-established
NGOs headed by experts and professionals from the North, or citizens of the South trained
in the North, and although some of these NGOs may form partnerships with smaller
community-based actors these relations are characterised by ‘infinite dependence’ (2003,
p. 76). This leads her to question ‘whose political agendas do these NGOs advance when
they intervene in crucial areas of collective life such as development, environment, health,
education, and women’s empowerment?’ (Chandhoke, 2003, p. 72) A range of empirical
studies support Chandhoke’s argument; including studies from Latin America (Grugel,
2000), Senegal, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (Michael, 2004), Sri Lanka (Goonatilake, 2006),
Bangladesh (Feldman, 2003) and East Timor (Brunnstrom, 2003). Furthermore, it has been
demonstrated that in certain locations where formalised NGOs did not already exist they
have been created by governments in order to access international funding and fulfil IFI
conditions (Obadare, 2005; Vasavakul, 2003).
Therefore, while access to the development space may have increased for civil society
the space is dominated by professional, formal and compliant actors. Civil society actors
granted access to the development space must curb any radical or transformative
inclinations to continue to receive access and funding. Restrictions are even more
pronounced for civil society actors in the South as they compete with each other for grants
and partnerships with Northern NGOs, IFIs and bilateral donors. This does not necessarily
mean that civil society actors granted access to the development space have had no
influence or are less legitimate representatives than those excluded. Indeed, the opening of
the development space is an improvement on decades of exclusion for virtually all civil
society actors. However, the asymmetries of power apparent in the opening of the
development space can curtail and control the level of influence of those granted access and
limit the types of actors granted access in the first instance. In this process a potentially vast
source of alternative ideas and practices is also lost.
In addressing the question of ‘which civil society actors are granted access to the
development space?’ three broad types of civil society actors emerge from the critical
literature. The first are formalised civil society organisations based in the North that have
access to institutions where the development agenda is set and negotiated, particularly IFIs
and United Nations agencies. They implement development priorities in the South, often in
partnerships with local organisations, and their professional development expertise gives
them disproportionate power over their Southern partners. The need to implement
programs funded by IFIs and other international donors limits their transformative
potential making them likely to reproduce the development agenda (Murphy, 2005). The
second are formalised civil society organisations from the South that work in partnership
with Northern organisations, IFIs and often their own national governments. In order to be
chosen to work in partnerships these organisations must relinquish their autonomy andCopyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 22, 20–36 (2010)
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partners. Despite being staffed by and often headed by nationals from the country in
question, professional requirements mean that the staff are generally drawn from the social
and political elite, limiting their understating of development needs of people from other
class and ethnic groups and ensuring they have an embedded interest in maintaining the
broader status quo (Mohan, 2002, p. 133; Townsend et al., 2002; Ulvila and Hossain, 2002;
Dasgupta and Beard, 2007). The third are local civil society actors that are more deeply
involved in communities at the grassroots. The types of civil society actors funded through
IFIs and operational agencies are generally those more able to present themselves as more
professionalised which potentially marginalises smaller and less professionalised actors.
Some of these actors may have a deeper understanding of local development needs, though
this is not necessarily a given. As distinct from the second type of actors above, they have
limited access to the development space and to funds and partnerships whether
international or national (Amoore and Langley, 2004, p. 99). This third type of actor not
only includes formalised NGOs and philanthropic groups, but also more informal social
movements, community groups, networks of activists and collectives. In much of the
literature these actors are perceived as having a better understanding of development needs,
have more sustainable solutions to development problems and are able to utilise knowledge
that is otherwise marginalised by Northern expertise. Though still relatively powerless
against the top-down, professionalised, development establishment (White, 1996) they are
perceived to provide the best hope for alternative development approaches. It should
be noted that this perception has also been accused of reifying and romanticising the
grassroots, glossing over inequalities and homogenising communities (Agrawal and
Sivaramakrishnan, 2001, p. 12).
While both the critical approach to the opening of the development space and the
differentiation between types of civil society actors are welcome, the critical approach
stops short of fully engaging with religious actors. While there has been a surge of the
literature on the role of religion in development over the last decade, critical scholars have
contributed little to these discussions. We begin to address this shortcoming by examining
the role of religious actors in negotiating, setting and most crucially contesting the
development agenda.4 FAITH AND ETHICS AGENDA AT THE WORLD BANK
As the study of world politics grapples with the question of secularism and its alternatives
(Casanova, 1994; Berger, 1999; Esposito and Watson, 2000; Norris and Inglehart, 2004;
Thomas, 2005; Fox and Sandler, 2006; Hurd, 2008) there is an increasing awareness that
religious actors are prominent in vast numbers of communities in the South. As a World
Bank working paper recently acknowledged, ‘religion is a central part of the international
system. . . even if it wished to do so, the Bank could not entirely sidestep the faith
engagement’ (World Bank, 2006, p. 3). An emerging body of the literature is concerned
with the relationships between religion and development (Eade, 2002; Harcourt, 2003;
Thomas, 2004; Marshall and Keough, 2005; Marshall and Van Saanen, 2007; Clarke
and Jennings, 2008). This section considers the role of religious actors in the opening of
the development space. The question ‘who sets the development agenda?’ needs to be
extended via two additional questions: ‘what role do religious actors play in setting the
development agenda?’ and ‘which religious actors are included and which are excluded?’Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 22, 20–36 (2010)
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national development agenda. A critical reading of the faiths and development program of
the World Bank provides an insight into the place of religion in this process. There are least
three external and three internal factors that helped reposition the World Bank on the
question of religion. These elements emerged in the same context as the opening of the
development space in the 1980s and 1990s. Firstly, highly effective NGO advocacy against
World Bank environmental policy in the mid-1980s included religious advocacy groups
which instigated the direct engagement with religious actors (Pallas, 2005, p. 678). In
addition, a coalition of advocacy groups on environmental issues called the Alliance for
Religion and Conservation (ARC) emerged in the mid-1980s and was formalised as an
NGO in 1995 (Palmer and Finlay, 2003, p. xv). In 1997 the ARC network facilitated the
first high-level linkages between the World Bank and religious leaders (ARC, 2008).
Secondly, religious advocacy on debt in the South via the Jubilee 2000 campaign
influenced the policy priorities of in-coming World Bank President, James Wolfensohn on
the issue of highly indebted countries (Valley, 1990; Marshall and Keough, 2004, p. 44).
Faith-based advocacy on debt relief and human rights subsequently became mainstreamed
in influential policy networks, notably in the UK and the US, and has continued to be a
prominent part of the international development agenda (Busby, 2007; Clarke, 2007).
Thirdly, policy developments on religion in other international organisations such as the
United Nations, Inter-American Development Bank, World Health Organisation and the
International Labour Organisation influenced the World Bank’s approach (Peccoud, 2004;
Thomas, 2005, pp. 225–226; World Bank, 2006, p. 6). The Bank has documented a raft of
other linkages between religious actors and development institutions (Belshaw et al., 2001;
Marshall and Marsh, 2003; Marshall and Keough, 2004; Marshall and Keough, 2005;
Marshall and Van Saanen, 2007).
There are also three internal processes important for understanding the increasing
interest in religion within the World Bank. Firstly, an informal staff forum called the Friday
Morning Group explicitly linked religion to a ‘values’ discussion at the Bank, and
contributed to the institution’s move beyond a structural adjustment ethos (Beckmann
et al., 1991). David Beckmann, who helped found the group in 1981, warned the institution
in 1983 that ‘the Bank’s activities have become markedly less focused on reducing poverty’
(Kapur et al., 1997, p. 349; Thomas, 2005, pp. 225–226). Secondly, World Bank President
Wolfensohn (1995–2005) was personally determined to bring religion into the Bank’s
operations (Marshall and Van Saanen, 2007, pp. 5–8) despite the Executive Board voting in
2001 to reject Wolfensohn’s proposal to establish a small ‘Directorate on Faith’ by 24 votes
to zero (Tyndale, 2003, p. 25; Wolfensohn, 2004, pp. 21–22; see also Clarke, 2007).4 The
program survived as a specialised unit within the External Affairs Vice Presidency to
be funded by the discretionary President’s Contingency Fund and the Development
Dialogue for Values and Ethics was established to operationalise World Bank partnerships
with religious actors (World Bank, 2006). Thirdly, the survey Voices of the Poor,
commissioned to inform the World Development Report 2000–2001, revealed that among
the sixty thousand poor women and men surveyed, ‘churches and mosques, as well as4Various explanations of this vote have been offered. Wolfensohn situates the problem with state stakeholders at
the WB: ‘national governments do not give homes to faith-based organisations typically in their own admin-
istrative set-ups, and they are just not prepared to let us do it.’ (Wolfensohn, 2004, pp. 21–22; Tyndale, 2003, p. 25)
posits a ‘link between religious groups and political conflicts in many parts of world’; Clarke (2007) suggests
‘concern about the erosion of church-state boundaries in the USA and its potential spill-over into US policy on
international development’.
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 22, 20–36 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/jid
The Dynamics Of Inclusion And Exclusion 27sacred trees, rivers, and mountains’ were highly valued among the poor who were also
aware of the detrimental effects of actions by religious actors on the development of their
communities (Narayan, 2001, pp. 45–46). The priority to engage ‘religion’ was thus
embedded within the Bank’s own knowledge expertise.
The external and internal factors above describe ways in which religion entered the
policy discourse, networks and institutional framework of perhaps the most influential
actor involved in setting the international development agenda. Added to these are broader
imperatives demanded by the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington.
The World Bank example demonstrates the ways that religious actors are included in the
process of negotiating and setting the development agenda. The following section frames
this process of inclusion against some important exclusionary dynamics.5 EXCLUDING RELIGION FROM ABOVE
As previously discussed, critical approaches to the role of civil society in development
discuss three broad types of civil society actors as a way of identifying asymmetrical
relations of power. When applied to religious actors involved in development this approach
reveals important differences in the status of religious actors and the potential for exclusion
from the development space of particular types of religious actors. We illustrate this by
classifying religious actors associated with the World Bank using the typology of civil
society actors constructed above. Groups have been selected because they meet one of
three criteria: they have entered into formal partnerships with the World Bank, have been
involved in specific dialogues with the World Bank on development issues, or have been
identified as prospective development partners by the World Bank. The differentiation of
these actors according to the critical development typology is demonstrated in Table 1.
Table 1 is not designed to critique the relative contributions of listed organisations, but to
indicate the relative position and type of religious actors in relation to the World Bank. This
highlights three characteristics of the World Bank’s faith and development agenda. The
first is a priority towards formalised organisations. This is to be expected given that the
institutional requirements of the World Bank favour partnerships of formal activities and
reporting and that the requirements binding the World Bank’s ideology for faith and
development partnerships lies in a benchmarking activity measured by the Millennium
Development Goals (Marshall and Marsh, 2003). The second is that engagements with
religious actors categorised above as informal are more problematic for the Bank. For
example, the Guatemalan Inter-religious Dialogue on Development (DIRGD) revealed a
‘glaring lack of documentation, understanding and use of the rich store of knowledge, work
and ideas of faith institutions in development realms’ (Marshall and Keough, 2004, p. 88).
The Ethiopian Interfaith Forum for Development Dialogue and Action (EIFDDA) was, in
turn, hindered by an inability to engage constructively with the economic framework of the
World Bank’s poverty reduction strategy and its lack of formalised membership resulted in
a lack of ‘clear strategic direction’ (Marshall and Keough, 2004, p. 92). And the third is the
mechanism used to include informal faith-based programs in the World Bank program was
the World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD). Though described as an ‘independent
NGO’ the WFDD was from its inception dependent upon directives from the Development
Dialogue team at the World Bank. Despite its commitment to deep engagements with
religious communities, the WFDD experienced difficulties ‘especially over how WFDD is
perceived by faith communities critical of the World Bank, IMF. . . and G7/8’ (Taylor et al.,Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 22, 20–36 (2010)
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Table 1. Classifying religious actors linked to the World Bank within a critical development
typology of civil society actors
Formal organisations in
the North: setting the
development agenda
Formal organisations in
the South: access to the
development agenda
Informal actors in the
South: limited access
to the development agenda
World vision1 Community of Sant’Egidio2 Guatemalan inter-religious dialogue
on development (DIRGD)5
World faiths development
dialogue (WFDD)1, 2
World council of Churches2 Council of Anglican
Provinces of Africa3
Ethiopian interfaith forum for
development dialogue and action
(EIFDDA)5
Spirit of Fes foundation2 Sarvodaya movement3
Women, faith and development
alliance (WFDA)2
Vikram Sarabhai foundation3
Delegates of World religions3 Aga Khan foundation3 Interfaith health sector dialogue
(Tanzania)5
Alliance for religions and
conservation4
AVENA4
Religions for peace4
World parliament of religions4
United religions initiative4
3iG Int’l interfaith investment
group4
Pontifical counsel on justice
and peace4
Sources: World Bank Civil Society Program; World Bank Development Dialogue on Ethics and Values; Belshaw
et al., 2001; Palmer and Finlay, 2003; Marshall and Keough, 2004; World Bank, 2006; Marshall and Van Saanen,
2007.
Key:
1Civil Society program partners.
2Partnerships established via the development dialogue on ethics and values.
3Dialogue and research partners in development.
4Partnerships proposed by the World Bank working paper (2006).
5Community development dialogues facilitated for the World Bank by the WFDD.
28 D. McDuie-Ra and J. A. Rees2003, p. 2). In 2005 it was placed ‘in hibernation awaiting decisions by its trustees and
partners (notably the World Bank)’ (World Bank, 2006, p. 1, fn. 1). Yet significantly, from
its own inception the Development Dialogue was virtually ignored at the executive levels
of the World Bank (World Bank, 2006, pp. 1,4) and its eventual inclusion in the Human
Development Anchor is described as philosophically and instrumentally unsuccessful
(World Bank, 2006, p. 4).
From this brief example we identify three factors that demonstrate the value of a critical
reading of religion in the development space. Firstly, formalised religious organisations
seem to have a different capacity than informal religious groups and communities in
relations with IFIs as they have access to the political spaces where the international
development agenda is negotiated and set. This is not to suggest that such groups cannot
challenge the development agenda. The peace-making record of the Community of
Sant’Egidio and the advocacy potential of the newly formed WFDA are both examples of
this. Yet of equal significance are the limitations that formality places on contesting
dominant ideas and practices. This is particularly important for analysing religiousCopyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 22, 20–36 (2010)
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communities than organisations (Thomas, 2004), suggesting a divergence between the
types of actors included in the development space and the types of actors embedded in
communities, especially in the South. Thus, from a World Bank perspective the informal
engagements described in Table 1 are attributed with a lesser status as ‘guideposts’ when
compared to partnerships with formal organisations which are considered as models
(Marshall and Keough, 2004, p. 87). This may be not only due to the embryonic nature of
initiatives, but also because they constitute attempts by informal networks of religious
actors embedded in communities to engage in grassroots transformative partnerships (see
Tyndale, 2006).
Secondly, formal institutional organs designed to enrich faith and development
partnerships at the grass-roots level within and outside the World Bank are themselves
marginalised from centralised development processes. For instance the WFDD and the
Development Dialogue on Ethics and Values have both struggled for legitimacy and
funding. If central bodies such as these are ineffective, it is more than reasonable to suggest
a large number of informal religious actors operating at the local level in the South remain
completely excluded from the so-called rise of religion in development at the international
level. In this sense the World Bank is an arena of contestation where religious development
priorities can be co-opted and marginalised.
Thirdly, the dynamics of including and excluding religious actors homogenises religion
and co-opts it into the knowledge base of IFIs, further limiting the potential for
development alternatives from religious actors. Clarke has usefully categorised FBOs into
five types: apex bodies, charitable/development organisations, socio-political organis-
ations, missionary organisations and illegal or terrorist organisations (Clarke, 2008,
pp. 24–32). Combining Clarke’s categories and our critical development typology, World
Bank engagements with FBOs described above seem to homogenise religion around apex
bodies and development organisations over socio-political organisations whose activities
might fall outside the priorities of the development agenda. Yet it is also noteworthy that
Clarke’s FBO typology is based on degrees of formality, and informal development
activities grounded in religious communities remain excluded from the analysis. The
inclusion of religious actors in the development space requires an accommodation of both
socio-political advocacy groups and informal associations and networks.
These factors illustrate the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion towards religious civil
society actors by IFIs and within international development more broadly. The exclusion of
informal religious actors embedded in communities in the South, in turn, excludes many of
the possibilities of transformative change and development alternatives. Thus, only a
limited number of voices emerge from the religious ‘sector’ in development. A critical
reading of religious actors differentiates between the types of actors included in the
development space and those that are excluded and examines the limitations on their ability
to negotiate and set the development agenda. We also begin to see the asymmetries of
power between IFIs and religious actors, between different types of religious actors, and
even within IFIs. Yet it is here that the critical approach to religious actors in development
tends to stop short. For critical research aimed at altering asymmetrical relations of power
within the development agenda, the challenge exists to broaden analysis of civil society
actors to include organisational and community-based dynamics of religion within its own
critique. Beyond the boundaries of the development agenda, the possibility of religion as a
deep resource for contesting development orthodoxy and providing alternatives is poorly
conceptualised and often ignored.Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 22, 20–36 (2010)
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Whilst the critical view highlights the exclusion of informal religious actors from above,
critical approaches operate with a limited view of religion from below. This undermines
critiques of inclusion and exclusion of religious actors in the development space.5 This
excludes two important dynamics of religion in development. First, critical approaches
overlook the role of religion in the material contestations of development. The importance
of materialist concerns in the critical tradition is matched by a suspicion of the transcendent
ideologies of religion that are seen to undermine the immanent and situated needs of the
poor. We challenge oppositional binaries between material/secular and spiritual/religious
concerns, and argue that it is misleading to conclude that the materialist ontology of the
critical traditional is incompatible with religious agency (Fox and Sandler, 2006, p. 170).
A prime example of critical development ideology and practice by religious actors is the
liberation theology movements that flourished in Central and South America between
the 1960s and 1990s. Not unlike critical approaches more generally, liberation theologies
have passed through forms of ‘leftist fundamentalism’ towards ‘a more complex reading’
of power and development (Miguez, 2006, p. 125). Liberation theology is rooted in a
praxis-based epistemology (Bennett, 2007). It is grounded in theological and political
advocacy for the poor (Bonino, 1975; Boff and Boff, 1987, pp. 1–10) and in Freire’s
ideology of conscientisation (Berryman, 1987, pp. 34–38). It also incorporates both
materialist and indigenous re-readings of religious tradition (Miranda, 1974; Belo, 1981;
Brown, 1984; Miguez, 2006, pp. 122–125). Liberation theologies construct frameworks for
action where immanent (liberationist) and transcendent (salvationist) ideals are employed
to advocate for those who are ‘are totally outside the system’ and who suffer the ‘idolatry of
the market’, ‘exclusion’ and commodification (Miguez, 2006, p. 129).
In his seminal work, A Theology of Liberation, Gutierrez set the cause of liberation for
‘oppressed peoples and social classes’ by critiquing developmentalist (desarrollista)
orthodoxy and infusing religious elements into alternative development conceptions (1973,
pp. 21–42). For Gutierrez, it was within a ‘radical perspective of liberation’—grounded in
the situated faiths and communities of the poor—that development ‘finds its true meaning
and possibilities of accomplishing something worthwhile’ (1973, p. 36). Such peoples are
overwhelmingly religious in outlook, and this impacts directly on how development is
perceived. In the contemporary context similar movements have been identified in Korea
(Suh, 1991), Malawi (Mitchell, 2002), Senegal (Galvan, 2004), Cambodia (Poethig, 2002)
and Thailand (Darlington, 1998) to name a small sample. They represent important
expressions of a critical re-reading of culture by religious actors and a core dimension of
the ‘global struggle for authenticity’ in development emanating from the South (Haynes,
1994, pp. 18–43; Thomas, 2000, p. 818).
The second issue excluded by critical approaches is the potential for counter-hegemonic
agency by religious traditions. The recent inclusion of religion in setting the development
agenda can be read as an expression of the hegemony of Northern interests (Clarke, 2008,
pp. 18–21). Indeed, aspects of the critical reading of the World Bank’s faiths and
development agenda above encourage such an observation. Yet we argue that this is not a
sufficient point upon which to rest. Religious traditions are best understood as ambivalent
(Appleby, 2000, pp. 288–301; Haynes, 2007, pp. 53–74). In practice this means that5Additionally, this limitation could be extended to critical considerations of exclusion from below in civil society
more generally, though this is beyond the scope of this article.
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also the potential to articulate and gain support for such alternatives. Critical approaches
must understand this to more fully account for counter-hegemonic activity taking place in
the South. Further, research needs to be directed towards actors excluded from the
development agenda and their agency needs to be re-evaluated. There are numerous
examples of this ranging from the role of religious actors in anti-dam movements in Brazil
(Rothman and Oliver, 2002), opposition to mining in the Philippines (Holden and
Jacobsen, 2007), and promoting neglected aspects of development such as health (Farmer,
2005), water and other basic needs (Patterson, 2007), which can explicitly or implicitly
critique dominant development priorities and practices.
Religion and religious actors are embedded in social and political worlds in the South
that make them difficult to ‘see’ and measure using conventional analysis of formalised
organisations. However, given the importance of religious agency it is imperative that
critical theorists not exclude religion from counter-hegemonic praxis. Studies of religious
actors in counter-hegemonic movements tend to escape this dilemma by name swapping.
For example, religious groups become ‘community groups’, ‘grassroots organisations’, or
part of ‘social movements’ when they challenge the hegemony of the development agenda
whereas they remain ‘religious’ when they are associated with dominant ideas and
practices. We argue for a new categorisation of religious actors. Agency, whether
hegemonic or counter-hegemonic, cannot clearly be attributed to either sacral or secular
structures, ideas or worldviews. At the local level the secular and sacral are mutually
constitutive (Asad, 2003, pp. 21–66; Marty, 2003).
Rather than simply adding religion to the critical secular frameworks of the past, new
research initiatives that take religion seriously need to be resituated within a secular-sacral
conception of the spaces of development, and founded in an ambivalent notion of religion.
Unless this can be achieved, critical approaches to development will continue to exclude
core elements of religion that, in turn, will undermine its ability to critique the development
agenda and the cooption of civil society. It is a particular challenge for critical scholars
from the North who are susceptible to ‘speak about Third World societies in terms. . . that,
as it were, socially homogenised the poverty of those societies’ (Kitching, 2001, p. 302).
By contrast, Nandy’s perspective usefully differentiates religion as ‘ideology’ and religion
as ‘faith’. Religion as ideology takes the form of a ‘sub-national, national or cross-national
identifier of populations contesting for or protecting non-religious, usually political or
socioeconomic, interests’ (Nandy, 2002, pp. 61–62). This is contrasted by, and in conflict
with, the concept of faith as ‘religion as a way of life, a tradition which is definitely non-
monolithic and operationally plural’ (Nandy, 2002, p. 62). For Nandy, in differentiating the
‘two axis on which. . . contemporary religions can be plotted’ the state ‘always prefers to
deal with religious ideologies rather than with faiths’ (Nandy, 2002, pp. 63–4). We suggest
the same with regards to IFIs and the cooption of formal religious actors into the
development agenda.7 CONCLUSION
We have introduced the issues above with the intention of provoking further critical inquiry
into the role of religion in negotiating, setting and contesting the development agenda.
Critical approaches to the opening of the development space, and particularly the role of
civil society, are helpful in identifying the asymmetries of power between IFIs and civilCopyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 22, 20–36 (2010)
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development space are crucial for analysing the hegemony of the international
development agenda and the potential for counter-hegemonic agency. We argue that
these relations are thoughtfully and effectively articulated in critical approaches towards
civil society in development. However, we suggest that the critical approach has not been
extended to religious actors despite their influence in communities in the South. By
drawing on the exclusion of religious actors from above and from below we have
argued that religious actors are subject to a limited engagement that overlooks their role
in reproducing hegemonic relations and holding counter-hegemonic potential in
the development space to generate alternatives. Understanding the mutually constitutive
relationship between secular and sacral elements of the social world will, in turn,
enable critical theorists to differentiate the effects of religious civil society actors at the
international and local levels.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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